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This paper develops a model of the market for corporate incorporations and 
uses it to study the outcome and performance of this market. A central feature of the 
US corporate environment is the presence of competition among jurisdictions. 
Companies are free to choose their state of incorporation, and they are governed by 
the corporate law of the state they choose. Whether and to what extent this 
competition works well has been one of the most hotly debated subjects in corporate 
scholarship in the last quarter of a century. As the European Union has been moving 
toward giving European companies some freedom to choose their country of 
incorporation, this subject has become important there as well. 
The large existing literature on state competition has focused on two questions. 
One question concerns the quality of the incentives produced by competition. 
According to the dominant view among corporate law scholars, competition 
generally pushes states, including Delaware, to adopt rules that benefit shareholders 
(see Winter (1977, 1989), Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), Fischel (1982) and Romano 
(1993a, 1993b, 1998)). An alternative view holds that state competition pushes states 
to adopt rules benefiting managers, not shareholders, with respect to an important 
set of corporate issues (see Cary (1974), Bebchuk (1992) and Bebchuk and Ferrell 
(1999, 2001)). 
The other subject that has attracted much attention concerns the structure of the 
incorporations market. The market has been long characterized by one dominant 
player. Among publicly traded non-financial firms, Delaware is the domicile of 58% 
of the publicly traded companies, 59% of the Fortune 500 companies, and 67% of the 
companies that went public during 1996-2000 (Bebchuk and Cohen (2002)). In the 
face of this market structure, researchers have discussed what explains the 
emergence and persistence of a dominant state (Romano (1985), Black (1990), 
Klausner (1995), Kamar (1998)) and how the desire to maintain and take advantage 
of such dominance affects the behavior of this dominant state (Ayres (1995), Kamar 
(1998), Kahan and Kamar (2001)).  
Although a great deal has been written on state competition in the past three 
decades, there has been surprisingly little effort to develop a formal framework that 
would enable a rigorous study of the subject. The present paper seeks to fill this 
void. It develops a model of the market for corporate law, and it uses this model to 
study the questions long discussed informally with the discipline provided by a 
formal model. The model enables us to resolve significant debates in the literature, 
to confirm some informally made claims while rejecting others, and to identify 
issues that have been thus far overlooked. 
  1In our model, each state chooses its strategy — what rules to offer, whether to 
invest in creating a legal infrastructure, what prices to charge, and so forth. 
Companies then make incorporation decisions. Clearly, states choose their strategies 
in anticipation of the reactions to them by other states and by companies. We solve 
for the equilibrium outcome and study its features. 
When a company is incorporated in a given state, payoffs to shareholders and 
managers are determined by (i) the substantive content of the state’s corporate law 
rules, (ii) the institutional texture of the state’s corporate environment, including the 
existence (or absence) of legal infrastructure (e.g. a specialized judiciary) and the 
presence (or absence) of beneficial network externalities, and (iii) the price charged 
by the state – either directly (e.g. franchise taxes) or indirectly (e.g. fees paid to the 
local bar).  
As far as the substantive content of corporate rules is concerned, we shall 
distinguish (following Bebchuk (1992)) between two categories of rules. The first 
category includes rules that have little or no effect on the ability of managers to 
extract private benefits of control. With respect to these rules – which can be labeled 
insignificantly redistributive rules – both the managers and the shareholders of 
existing companies prefer rules that maximize cash flows to shareholders. The 
second category of rules includes those that might have a significant effect on 
managers’ ability to extract private benefits. Rules governing takeovers, self-dealing, 
and taking of corporate opportunities are examples of such rules. With respect to 
these rules – which might be called significantly redistributive rules – managers of 
existing companies might prefer rules that would increase their private benefits 
even if such rules would not maximize the cash flows to shareholders. 
We allow payoffs to depend not only on the substantive content of legal rules 
but also on “institutional” factors such as the existence of a legal infrastructure and 
network externalities. Because Delaware’s investment in a specialized judiciary 
might provide benefits to Delaware companies (see Romano (1985), Black (1990) and 
Fisch (2000)), we assume that cash flows may increase from the presence of a legal 
infrastructure. Following the arguments that companies benefit from having many 
other companies incorporated in the same state (see Klausner (1995) and Kahan and 
Klausner (1997)), we allow for network externalities. Such externalities include the 
benefits that a company may enjoy from having more precedents to rely on and 
from being subject to rules and practices with which capital market participants are 
well familiar.  
We also allow payoffs to depend on the price charged by the state of 
incorporation. More importantly, we include the price charged by states as an 
endogenous element of states’ strategies. The literature had largely assumed that 
states can maximize profits from incorporations by maximizing the number of 
  2incorporated companies, implicitly assuming that the price paid by companies is 
exogenously fixed. As Kahan and Kamar (2001) pointed out, however, Delaware 
also makes choices with respect to the prices it charges.1 In our model, in setting the 
prices charged, the dominant state takes into account the effects of the price it sets 
both on Delaware’s revenues and on the incentives of other states to mount a 
challenge to Delaware’s dominance.  
We will focus in the first part of our analysis on the (re)incorporation decisions 
of existing publicly traded companies. We then extend our analysis to allow for 
IPOs. We show that our results largely apply to the case in which the stock of 
publicy traded firms is increased in any given period by new IPOs as long as the 
number of such IPOs is not too large relative to the existing stock of non-Delaware 
companies. When analyzing reincorporation decisions, we take as given the long-
standing rules of US corporate law, under which reincorporation of an existing 
company requires board initiation followed by a vote of shareholder approval.  
As to the payoffs of states, we shall assume that states seek to maximize 
revenues. A state’s revenue (or payoff) is the product of the price it charges 
incorporated companies multiplied by the number of such companies. Also, for any 
given level of revenues, we assume that a state prefers more incorporation to less.  
In making its decisions, each state will take into account how companies as well as 
other states will react to it. The dominant state will also consider whether its 
decisions will create an incentive for other states to expend resources to challenge its 
dominance.  
Using the above building blocks, we derive the equilibrium in the state 
competition game. One main result is that state competition works differently for 
rules that do and do not have a significant effect on managers’ private benefits of 
control. When a corporate issue does not have a significant effect on managers’ 
private benefits of control, state competition will push states to adopt rules that 
would best serve shareholders. However, with respect to rules that have a 
substantial effect on managers’ private benefits of control, such as rules governing 
corporate takeovers or managerial conflicts of interests, states might adopt rules that 
make shareholders worse off. In particular, the dominant state will have to do so in 
order to attract reincorporations from other states and in order to prevent other 
states from being able to beat it in attracting companies willing to leave their 
“home” state. In this respect, our results support the view taken by Bebchuk (1992) 
                                                 
1  Kahan and Kamar (2001) focus on the possibility that, facing heterogeneous companies that differ 
in the benefits they derive from the advantages offered by Delaware, Delaware will seek to charge 
different prices to different companies. In contrast, we focus on a strategic role that the setting of 
price has regardless of whether such heterogeneity is present. 
 
  3and Bebchuk and Ferrell (1999, 2001) that state competition might produce rules 
tilted in favor of managers’ interests with respect to significantly redistributive 
issues. 
State competition might lead to the adoption of rules that excessively favor 
managers not just by the dominant state but also by other states. In the identified 
equilibrium, all states seeking to maximize their success in the incorporation market 
will adopt the same rules. In this equilibrium, companies moving to the dominant 
state would make shareholders better off. Even though the dominant state has rules 
that are not optimal for shareholders with respect to some issues, so do other states, 
and the dominant state at least offers companies advantages in terms of legal 
infrastructure and network externalities. Thus, in equilibrium, even though state 
competition does not perform well with respect to issues that are significantly 
redistributive, companies will benefit from reincorporation in Delaware. Therefore, 
the performance of state competition cannot be assessed based on examining how a 
move to Delaware affects corporate value, which has been the standard approach in 
the empirical analysis of the subject.  
Our analysis highlights the importance of the established procedure for 
“switching” from state to state for the equilibrium in the market for corporate law. 
Under this procedure, managers have a veto power over reincorporations. 
Moreover, whereas the shareholders also have a veto power, managers must initiate 
the vote on reincorporation, which essentially gives them the power to make a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the shareholders regarding reincorporation. Thus, if a move 
from a company’s home state to either one of two states would benefit shareholders, 
the managers would be able to determine the state to which the company would 
move. Faced with a choice between remaining in their home state and 
reincorporating to whichever one of the two states managers favor, shareholders can 
be expected to approve the reincorporation. This feature of the situation strengthens 
the incentives of the dominant state to choose certain rules that are favored by 
managers but not shareholders.2 
Our model explains how a state that has moved first to invest in legal 
infrastructure will be able to obtain, and subsequently maintain, a dominant 
position. The initial advantage that the state might have due to its legal 
infrastructure will be reinforced by network externalities, as companies will 
(correctly) anticipate that other companies also will be drawn to the dominant state. 
Furthermore, the dominant state will set its rules and prices in such a way as to 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of the general problems arising from managers’ control over the corporate agenda, 
and their ability to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to shareholders, see Bebchuk (2001). 
  4provide no incentive for other states to make similar investments in legal 
infrastructure.  
Finally, our model explains how the dominant state will be able to make profits 
from the incorporation business but will not be able to capture the full benefits to 
companies incorporated in the dominant state from the legal infrastructure and 
network externalities they enjoy by incorporating in this state.3 The model thus can 
explain the phenomenon recently highlighted by Kahan and Kamar (2001) — that 
Delaware seems to make a high return on its investments but that it does not raise 
its prices to the highest level that companies would likely be willing to pay for 
Delaware incorporation. Indeed, Bebchuk and Hamdani (2002) calculate that 
Delaware obtains tax revenues from the incorporations business on the order of 
$2,000 for each family of four. We show that the advantage that a dominant state has 
c a n  e n a b l e  i t  t o  m a k e  p o s i t i v e  p r o f i t s  without inducing a rival to challenge its 
dominance. To prevent such a challenge, however, the dominant state will not raise 
its prices to fully capture the benefits companies would gain from incorporating in 
it.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
framework of the analysis. Section 3 solves the model and presents the resulting 
equilibrium in the market for corporate law. Section 4 studies several extensions to 
the basic model. Section 5 offers concluding remarks on the positive and normative 
implications of our analysis. 
 
2.    Framework of Analysis 
 
2.1.  Sequence of events 
 
The sequence of events in the model is as follows: 
T = 0: There is a set of states  { } n N ,..., 1 =  where  , including a dominant state, 
named “Delaware,” and other states; and a (large) number of companies, 
, whose initial incorporations are distributed among the n states. 
2 ≥ n
n m >>
T  =  1: The states choose their strategies, which include: whether they invest in 
creating a legal infrastructure; which legal rules they adopt; and what price 
they will charge companies incorporated in the state. 
                                                 
3 Thus, our model may explain why Delaware’s franchise tax seems low compared with any 
reasonable estimate of the value generated by Delaware’s legal infrastructure and the network 
externalities it provides to large publicly traded companies. While the value of the median company 
in Delaware is approximately $237 million (Daines (2001)), Delaware’s franchise tax does not exceed 
$150 thousand a year. This is the maximum tax even for companies whose stock market 
capitalization is in the dozens of billions of dollars.  
  5T = 2: Companies choose where to (re)incorporate.  











Fig. 1: Sequence of Events 
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The assumptions about each of the stages are described in detail below. 
 
2.2    T = 0: The Initial Situation 
 
We assume that, at T = 0, one state—which we call Delaware—has a legal 
infrastructure that may improve cash flows for companies incorporated in that state. 
The said infrastructure can be thought of as a specialized judiciary. As will be 
shown later on, network externalities will complement and reinforce Delaware’s 
initial infrastructure advantage. 
We assume that each one of the m companies has a “home” state, i.e. the state 
in which the company’s headquarters is located.  At T = 0, each company is assumed 
to be incorporated either in its “home” state or in Delaware. (In the case of 
companies located in Delaware, the “home” state and Delaware will be of course the 
same.) In particular, among the local companies of any given state, some (at least 
one) are incorporated “at home” and some (at least one) are incorporated in 
Delaware. We assume that at T = 0 Delaware already enjoys a significant number of 
incorporations.4  
                                                 
4 It is further assumed that, even though Delaware starts with a significant number of 
incorporations, there is at T=0 a significant number of companies incorporated outside Delaware. 
The fraction of companies that are initially out-of-state is assumed to be sufficiently large to make 
Delaware interested in luring companies from their “home” states rather than pursuing a strategy 
focusing solely on companies that are already incorporated in Delaware. Footnote 28 in Appendix A 
further elaborates on the analytical underpinnings of this condition. It also describes the equilibrium 
in the case in which Delaware focuses solely on the companies which it has at T=0; this case is of 
lesser importance, of course, in understanding the existing state competition in the US. 
  6Note that reincorporation does not affect the location of a company’s 
headquarters or its place of operation—but only the corporate law system to which 
the company will be subject. We initially assume that all of the companies have gone 
public prior to T = 0. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4.2. Each company 
is assumed to have dispersed ownership, with managers holding only a small 
fraction α  of the company’s shares.  
 
2.3   T=1: States Choose their Strategies 
 
At this stage, states choose, and make public, strategies consisting of three 
elements: (1) whether they make a special investment in legal infrastructure (of 
course, since Delaware already has such an infrastructure, this choice is relevant 
only for the other states), (2) which rules they adopt, and (3) what price they will 
charge incorporated companies.   
The states select and announce their strategies sequentially, with Delaware 
moving first and the order in which the remaining states move being chosen 
randomly. A state announcing its strategy cannot amend its strategy later on; but, of 
course, states will choose their strategy in anticipation of what other states will do. 
We next specify the assumptions about each of the three elements of the strategy 
each state chooses. 
 
2.3.1  Legal Infrastructure 
 
We assume that, by investing K, a state can establish a legal infrastructure—
similar to Delaware’s infrastructure—that would operate to improve cash flows for 
companies incorporated in the state. Formally, each state, other than Delaware, 
chooses its investment in infrastructure, k, from the set { } K , 0 . The infrastructure can 
be thought of as including a specialized judiciary and the various other services and 
institutions needed to have an experienced, smooth, and fast system for litigating 
cases.   
 
2.3.2.  Rules 
 
Each state must choose its rules with respect to each corporate issue. We 
characterize a legal rule by its effects on (1) the company’s cash flows, Y, and (2) the 
level of private benefits that managers can extract from the company, B. Issues can 
be divided into two categories: (i) issues that do not have a significant effect on 
private benefits, which are labeled “insignificantly redistributive issues,” and (ii) 
issues that have such a significant effect, which are labeled “redistributive issues.” 
  7Whereas shareholders and managers have overlapping interests and preferences 
with respect to issues of type (i), their interests and preferences diverge with respect 
to issues of type (ii).  
(i) Insignificantly redistributive issues: We assume that there is one issue, denoted 
NR, which belongs to this category. With respect to this issue, states must choose 
between the   rule and the 
NR L
NR H  rule. We normalize the effect of the   rule on 
cash flows to zero, and denote the effect of the 
NR L
NR H  rule on cash flows by Y . 
Hence, shareholders will be better off under 
0 >
NR
NR H  than under  . The choice 
between the two rules will have no or little effect on managers’ private benefits, and 
managers thus also prefer 
NR L
NR H  over  .  
NR L
Our results generally carry over to the case in which the choice between the 
two rules has an effect on managers’ private benefits but this effect is small enough 
that managers prefer 
NR H  because of its positive effect on cash flows.5 The main 
point is that, with respect to the insignificantly redistributive rules, there is no 
conflict of interests, and both shareholders and managers prefer 
NR H  over  . For 
simplicity of exposition, and without loss of generality, we assume that both the   
rule and the 
NR L
NR L
NR H  rule have an identical effect on managers’ private benefits, and we 
normalize this effect to zero. 
An example of an insignificantly redistributive rule is the rule requiring 
directors to attend board meetings. Although the rule imposes some small private 
cost on managers, this cost might be sufficiently small (relative to the cash flow 
benefits of having directors attend board meetings) that managers would not favor 
absenteeism.  
 (ii) Redistributive issues: This category includes rules with respect to which the 
interests of shareholders and managers diverge, because the rule that would 
increase cash flows would also significantly reduce private benefits, thus making it 
disfavored by managers. For example, shareholders might favor a takeover rule that 
managers would disfavor because of its effect on the managers’ private benefits, or 
shareholders might prefer a rule concerning conflict of interests that managers 
would disfavor. We do not claim, of course, that any reduction in managers’ private 
benefits would benefit shareholders. Some provision of private benefits is desirable 
in many cases. But once the optimal level of private benefits is reached, there is still 
commonly a choice between a rule that establishes this level and a rule that would 
go beyond it to provide managers with higher benefits. It is this choice that we focus 
on.  
                                                 
5 Specifically, suppose that, compared with 
NR H ,   increases managers’ private benefits by 
. As long as  , managers will have the same preferences regarding this 
issue as shareholders and will also prefer 
NR L
0 >
NR B 0 > − ⋅
NR NR B Y α
NR H  over  . 
NR L
  8Specifically, we assume that there is one issue that belongs to this category, R, 
and states can choose with respect to this issue R between the   rule and the 
R L
R H  
rule. We normalize the effect of the   rule on cash flows to zero, and denote the 
effect of the 
R L
R H  rule on cash flows by Y . Hence, shareholders prefer  0 >
R R H  over 
. Similarly, we normalize the effect of the 
R L
R H  rule on managers’ private benefits 
to zero, and denote managers’ private benefits under the   rule by  .  
R L 0 >
R B
We also assume, contrary to the assumption in the category of insignificantly 
redistributive rules, that  , so that managers prefer   over  0 < − ⋅
R R B Y α
R L
R H . The 
main point is that, with respect to the significantly redistributive rules, there is a 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. While shareholders prefer 
R H  over  , managers prefer   over 
R L
R L
R H .  
We further assume that while  ,   -- namely, the   rule 
is inefficient. Managers still prefer the inefficient   rule, since they capture the 
increase in private benefits produced by the rule but bear only a small fraction 
0 < − ⋅
R R B Y α 0 > −
R R B Y
R L
R L
α  of 
the reduction in cash flows created by it. The interesting question is whether state 
competition will result in the adoption of the efficient 
R H  rule, as supporters of state 
competition believe, or rather the inefficient   rule will be adopted, as critics 
contend. The claim that we seek to examine does not assert that competition would 
produce big inefficiencies but rather that its outcomes would be biased in their 
favor. To explore the possibility of such bias, we will assume that the inefficiency 




2.3.3.  Price 
 
A state’s strategy will also include the price   that each company 
incorporated in the state will have to pay. The price consists of the incorporation tax 
and all other payments to institutions and citizens of the state as a result of the 
incorporation – including court fees, fees paid to members of the local bar, and so 
forth. Prior literature, which has assumed that maximization of profits from 
incorporations is synonymous with maximization of the number of incorporations, 
has implicitly assumed that the revenue to the state from each company is 
exogenously fixed. A complete analysis of our subject, however, should not take 
price to be exogenous, and we shall therefore include price as an element of each 
state’s strategy. At the same time, we shall allow for the possibility that political 
forces might impose an exogenous bound on the price.
0 ≥ P
6  
                                                 
6 Our analysis can be extended, with little change in the results, to the case in which the price cannot 
go below a certain positive level because, even if the franchise tax is set at zero, the state’s lawyers 
will make some profits from the presence of incorporations.  
  92.4    T = 2: Incorporation Decisions 
 
At T = 2, the m companies choose their state of incorporation, making a choice 
between remaining where they were initially incorporated and reincorporating in 
another state. The companies move sequentially in a randomly selected order. Let t 
= 1,...,m denote the rounds within period T = 2, in which the m companies choose 
their state of incorporation (in random order), and let t = 0 denote the period before 
the first company moves. At t = 0, the companies are assumed to know the strategies 
chosen by the different states at T = 1.7 
It is assumed that reincorporation involves no transaction costs. The procedure 
for reincorporation is assumed to be the one that has been long established under 
US corporate law. The managers must initiate a reincorporation, making a proposal 
to the shareholders; if the shareholders approve, the company will move. Thus, 
reincorporation will occur if and only if both managers and shareholders wish to 
reincorporate. Furthermore, managers have the power to make take-it-or-leave-it 
offers to the shareholders. As a result, if reincorporation in either one of two states is 
superior to the present incorporation, the managers can direct reincorporation to the 
state that the managers prefer.  
We make several tie-breaking assumptions. When managers are indifferent 
between incorporating in the company’s home state and another state, they will 
prefer the home state. If managers are indifferent between reincorporating in two 
states none of which is the company’s home state, they will choose each one of the 
two states with a probability of fifty percent. Finally, we assume that, if shareholders 
are indifferent between accepting and rejecting a proposal by management, they 
will accept it. 
 
2.5    T=3: Payoffs 
 
At this stage, all players will receive their payoffs. The cash flows of a company 
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where   represents the element of a company’s cash flows that is independent of 
the legal system; Y  and   represent the effects of the non-distributive and the 







                                                 
7 As explained in section 2.5 below, there are two types of companies – those that benefit from a legal 
infrastructure and from network externalities and those that do not derive such benefits. It is 
assumed that at t = 0 the companies know their type. 
  10and  represents the benefits flowing from the state’s legal infrastructure and 
network externalities. 








                              
Companies do not benefit equally from a legal infrastructure or from network 
externalities. In particular, to some companies, the benefit of remaining incorporated 
in their “home” states may outweigh the increased cash flows generated by another 
state’s legal infrastructure and network externalities. For simplicity, we capture this 
effect by assuming that a company j is characterized by a parameter  { 1 , 0 ∈ j } δ , which 
determines whether or not the company benefits from infrastructure and network 
externalities. It is assumed that the share δ  of companies that do not benefit from 
infrastructure and networks, i.e. companies with  0 = j δ , is smaller than 0.5. 
Legal infrastructure increases the cash flows of  1 = j δ  companies incorporated 









k E i m
.8 The effect of the legal 
environment in Delaware is denoted  , even though Delaware’s investment 
in establishing an infrastructure is considered sunk in the present framework. 
However, potentially more important than the legal infrastructure are network 
externalities, which arise when many companies choose to incorporate in one 
specific state. These positive externalities include familiarity of the legal community 
and the participants in capital markets with the rules of that state, as well as the 
generation of a larger body of precedents, both of which can operate to increase the 
value of the company’s securities to investors (see Klausner (1995) and Kahan and 
Klausner (1997)). Formally, we assume that the network externalities effect in state i 
is increasing in the number of companies, which are incorporated in state i,  , i.e. 
) , ( D m K E
i m
( ∂E
.9 Finally, let  ( ) m ⋅ − ) 1 δ K E E = ( ,  denote the maximal level of benefits 
from a legal infrastructure and network externalities -- i.e., the level that would be 
enjoyed by companies that benefit from such institutional advantages if all such 
companies were incorporated in the same state (which, as we shall see, is what 
would happen in equilibrium). Given our interest in exploring the possibility of the 
adoption of rules somewhat (rather than hugely) tilted in favor of managers, we will 
assume that E  outweighs the potential inefficiency on the R rule dimension, 
R Y . 
                   
8  We assume that a legal infrastructure is efficient to establish, i.e. the per-company value of an 
infrastructure exceeds the per-company cost of establishing an infrastructure (at least if all of the 
1 = j δ  companies benefit from the infrastructure):  () ( )
m
K
m E m K E
⋅ −
> ⋅ − − ⋅ −
) 1 (
) 1 ( , 0 ) 1 ( ,
δ
δ δ . 
9 We assume that the number of  0 = j δ  companies incorporated in any non-Delaware state at T=0 is 
insufficient to produce a positive level of network externalities. 
  11The shareholders will receive their fraction of the company’s cash flows, 
() i Y ⋅ −α 1 . The manager will receive the private benefits of control in addition to their 
fraction of the cash flows, and they will thus get  . 
R
i i B Y + ⋅ α
Each state will receive the revenues, if any, from the incorporations it will have 
at the final T=3 stage. The state will get the price it set for incorporated companies, 
P, multiplied by the number of companies which end up incorporated in the state at 
the end of the T = 2 stage of (re)incorporation decisions.  
 
2.6    States’ Objectives 
 
With respect to the decision whether to establish a legal infrastructure, as well 
as with respect to the pricing strategy, states are assumed to seek to maximize their 
T = 3 revenues. Also, as a tie-breaking assumption, we assume that between two 
outcomes that provide the state with the same revenues, the state will prefer to have 
an outcome in which more companies are incorporated in that state. 
With respect to the legal rules, states will also be assumed to maximize 
revenues (and, as a tie-breaker, maximize the number of incorporations). However, 
we shall also explore below the possibility that the choice of legal rules in some 
states is not based on the above objective but rather on some historical, political, 
cultural, or ideological factors. In order to capture this potential heterogeneity, we 
will allow for states that deviate from the equilibrium revenue maximizing R rule 
(there is no reason to expect heterogeneity in the NR category). Specifically, we 
assume that if such deviations occur they are adopted by at least two (non-
Delaware) states. We refer to such states as “deviating states”. Even when we permit 
for such deviations, we shall assume that Delaware maximizes revenues from 
incorporations.  
 
3.   The Market Equilibrium 
 
This section presents our results concerning the equilibrium outcome in the 
market for corporate law and the intuition underlying these results. The following 
proposition describes the equilibrium in the market: 
 
Proposition 1: The market for corporate law has a unique equilibrium that has the following 
features:   
 
(1) All of the states choose the rule favored by shareholders with respect to the insignificantly 
redistributive issue (NR)--
NR H . 
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(2) The dominant state of Delaware chooses the inefficient   rule with respect to the 
significantly redistributive issue (R). 
R L
 
(3) With respect to the significantly redistributive issue (R), any state other than Delaware 
that chooses rules in order to attract incorporations chooses the inefficient   rule. (By 
assumption, if there are deviating states that do not choose legal rules this way, these states 
will choose the efficient 
R L
R H  rule). 
 
(4) The dominant state of Delaware sets the highest possible price that (i) preempts a 
potential rival from entering and establishing a competing legal infrastructure, (ii) makes 
reincorporation to it still profitable for all the companies that benefit from a legal 
infrastructure and from network externalities (i.e. companies with  1 = j δ ), and (iii) does not 




















(5) Delaware makes a positive profit from its incorporation business.  
 
(6) Delaware does not capture the full value of the benefits it confers on companies 
incorporated in it. 
 
(7) States that at T=0 do not have a legal infrastructure, i.e. all states other than Delaware, 
do not invest in establishing a legal infrastructure, i.e.  0 = ≠D i k . 
 
(8) All states, other than Delaware, set a price of zero, i.e.  0 = ≠D i P . 
 
(9) All of the companies that benefit from a legal infrastructure and network externalities 
will be incorporated in Delaware. 
 
(10) The companies that reincorporate in Delaware enjoy an increase in their share value. 
 
(11) Among non-Delaware states, if there are deviating states, then the states that choose the 
rule favored by managers with respect to the significantly redistributive issue (R),  , will 
enjoy more incorporations than the deviating states that choose the rule favored by 
shareholders with respect to the significantly redistributive issue (R), 
R L
R H . 
 
  13The results stated in proposition 1 are proved in appendix A. Below we 
describe the underlying intuition for each of the eleven features of the identified 
equilibrium and discuss the implications of the results. 
 
3.1   Efficient Choice of Rules concerning Insignificantly Redistributive Issues 
 
Since both managers and shareholders prefer 
NR H  over  , a state that sets 
 will have no company incorporated in it at T = 3. Consider two states that differ 





NR H . Any company that is initially incorporated in the first state will 
reincorporate into the second state. Moreover, if a company that is initially 
incorporated in a third state considers reincorporation into one of the two states, it 
will surely choose the second state with the 
NR H  rule. 
 
3.2   Delaware’s Inefficient Choice concerning Redistributive Issues 
 
Delaware must set the pro-manager redistributive rule,  , in order to lure 
reincorporations. Otherwise (if Delaware sets 
R L
R H ), a rival state would establish a 
competing infrastructure, set  , and lure all of the 
R L 1 = j δ  companies that benefit 
from a legal infrastructure and from network externalities. What is critical here is 
that, if reincorporation to more than one state would benefit shareholders, the 
managers will have the power to direct the incorporation to the state they prefer. 
Moreover, since managers must initiate reincorporation, if Delaware does not set 
, it will not be able to lure companies from states that do set  , even if these 
states do not establish a legal infrastructure. 
R L
R L
By setting  , Delaware ensures its ability to lure 
R L 1 = j δ  companies from any 
state that does not establish a competing infrastructure. Delaware can clearly lure 
1 = j δ  companies from no-infrastructure states that also choose  . Delaware can 
also lure 
R L
1 = j δ  companies from the deviating states that set 
R H , since the 
inefficiency of the   rule is outweighed by Delaware’s infrastructure and network 
externalities advantage (
R L
R Y E > ). 
 
3.3  The Inefficient Choices of Non-Delaware States  
concerning Redistributive Issues 
 
States other than Delaware cannot attract  1 = j δ  companies that benefit from a 
legal infrastructure and from network externalities. Therefore, the non-Delaware 
  14states that choose their legal rules to maximize revenues and incorporations will 
focus on the  0 = j δ  companies. By choosing the inefficient   rule these states can 
retain their local 
R L
0 = j δ  companies that were incorporated in-state at T=0. By setting 
 (as well as 
R L
NR H  and  0 = P ), a state prevents managers from initiating 
reincorporation. This strategy further allows states to regain  0 = j δ  local companies 
that were incorporated in Delaware at T=0.  
R
R L
Note that a state can retain its local  0 = j δ  companies that were incorporated 
in-state at T=0 by setting H  (as well as 
NR H  and  0 = P ), which would prevent 
shareholders from approving reincorporation.  But setting   enables the state not 
only to retain the local companies which were initially incorporated in the state but 
also to attract the incorporations of  0 = j δ  local companies that were incorporated in 
Delaware at T=0. (Otherwise, these companies will remain in Delaware or 
reincorporate to non-Delaware state that offers  .) 
R L
The results presented in sections 3.2 and 3.3 are consistent with the 
proliferation of antitakeover statutes and other takeover defenses among states (see 
Gartman (2000)). The body of academic opinion has largely viewed state takeover 
law as providing excessive protections against takeovers. Researchers who generally 
support state competition have been among those viewing state antitakeover 
statutes as excessive (see, e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), Romano (1993a, 
1993b)). The many scholars who believe that antitakeover statutes do not serve 
shareholders find support for their view in the empirical evidence on the effects of 
such statutes. The overwhelming majority of the event studies done on the adoption 
of state antitakeover statutes found either no price reactions or negative price 
reactions (see Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) and Gartman (2000)). Furthermore, 
researchers have also found evidence that state antitakeover statutes have operated 
to increase agency costs (Bertrand and Mullinathan (1998, 1999)). The result under 
consideration can explain why takeover law has nonetheless developed in this 
direction.  
 
3.4   Price Charged by Delaware  
 
Delaware will set the highest possible price that still satisfies three 
goals/constraints. Let us explain in turn the reason for each one of them:  
(1) Preempting Rivals: In setting the price, Delaware will seek to make it 
unattractive for rivals to mount a challenge on its dominance. To compete for 
dominance in the market for corporate law, a rival would need to establish an 
equivalent legal infrastructure. Delaware will therefore seek to discourage potential 
rivals from establishing such an infrastructure. Thus, Delaware will not set a price 
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m
K
⋅ − ) 1 ( δ
, which is the per-company (focusing on  1 = j δ  companies) cost of 
establishing an infrastructure. This price ensures that all of the  1 = j δ  companies will 
choose to incorporate in Delaware, even if another state establishes an infrastructure 
and sets the lowest possible price (without losing money), 
m
K
⋅ ) δ − 1 (
.10 If Delaware 
sets a higher price, a second state will establish a competing infrastructure and lure 
all  1 = j δ  incorporations.11 
(2) Luring reincorporations from other states: Another goal of Delaware is to 
lure companies from states without a legal infrastructure. Delaware must make sure 
that the overall package it offers is preferred by companies that benefit from a legal 
infrastructure and from network externalities, over the package offered by the other 
states. Delaware can achieve this goal by setting a price not higher than 
R Y E − . 
Namely, Delaware cannot price above the value of its infrastructure and potential 
network externalities minus the disadvantage to shareholders from its pro-manager 
redistributive rules. This price takes into account that all states offer the same 
insignificantly redistributive rule, 
NR H  (see part (1) of proposition 1), but that states 
may attempt to prevent shareholders of local companies from approving 
reincorporation in Delaware by offering the redistributive rule 
R H  (this price also 
takes into account that other states will set P = 0 – see part (8) of proposition 1).  
Note that as long as Delaware prices below  R Y E −  (and given the previous 
constraint on Delaware’s pricing strategy), it will lure all the companies that benefit 
from a legal infrastructure and from network externalities. Because Delaware’s 
luring all of these companies can be anticipated by each one of them in advance, the 
constraint on Delaware’s pricing strategy presumes the full extent of network 
externalities (recall that  () m K E E ⋅ − = ) 1 ( , δ ). 
                                                 
10 If Delaware sets a price of 
m
K
⋅ − ) 1 ( δ
, a second state can hope to attract any incorporations only if 
it establishes a competing infrastructure and sets a price of 
m
K
⋅ − ) 1 ( δ
. Given our tie-breaking 
assumption, the second state will enjoy all incorporations with a probability of 50%, and will thus 
lose money on average. Therefore, no state other than Delaware will establish an infrastructure. 
11 Theoretically, a no-infrastructure state with   can attempt to lure the 
R L 1 = j δ  companies. To 
prevent this, Delaware must abide by another constraint on its pricing strategy. It cannot price above 
the value of its infrastructure advantage, i.e.  ( ) ( ) m E m K E ⋅ PD − − ⋅ − ≤ ) 1 ( , 0 ) 1 ( , δ δ . However, 




m E m K E
−
> ⋅ − − ⋅ −
1 (
) 1 ( , 0 ) 1 ( , δ δ  (see note 8 above), this constraint is never 
binding. 
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pricing strategy is the political constraint, if any, on the range of acceptable prices. 
First, note that if there is no effective political constraint, i.e. P  is very large, then 
Delaware’s price will be determined by the two previous goals/constraints. 
However, if the political constraint is binding, it may force Delaware to price below 
the price levels dictated by the two previous goals/constraints. 
 
3.5   Delaware’s Profits  
 
In a market that is perfectly competitive, producers will break even, making no 
net profits. But the market for corporate law is not perfectly competitive. The 
benefits from legal infrastructure imply that there are economies of scale. And the 
presence of network externalities provides another departure from the perfect 
competition case. Because of the imperfect competition, the dominant state will be 
able to make positive profits from its incorporation business.  
As we have seen, Delaware will set a positive price. Since it will be successful 
in luring all of the  1 = j δ  companies (see part (9) of proposition 1), this means that 
Delaware will make a positive profit. (Recall that we are assuming, for now, that 
Delaware’s investment in establishing its legal infrastructure is sunk.) 
 
3.6    Delaware’s Inability to Capture the Full Value  
         of its Institutional Advantages  
 
As shown above, Delaware will make a positive profit. Generally, however, 
Delaware will not capture the full value to companies of the benefits they receive 
from incorporating in the state. To begin with, the desire to preempt other states 
from challenging its dominance will keep a lid on Delaware’s price (see part (4)(i) of 
proposition 1). Additionally, further price capping might or might not be introduced 
by the political constraint (see part (4)(iii) of proposition 1).  
Lastly, Delaware will generally not capture the full value it provides, even if 
the decisive consideration in its pricing strategy is Delaware’s desire to lure 
companies from other states (see part (4)(ii) of proposition 1). Recall, that in order to 
lure companies from other states Delaware must offer an overall package that is 
attractive to the shareholders of the target companies. As explained in section 3.4 
above, this overall package must include a price not higher than the value of 
Delaware’s infrastructure and potential network externalities minus the 
disadvantage to shareholders from its pro-manager redistributive rules (
R Y E − ). In 
particular, this price takes into account the fact that states may attempt to prevent 
shareholders of local companies from approving reincorporation in Delaware by 
  17offering the redistributive rule 
R H . However, at equilibrium these other states will 
offer  , just like Delaware, and not 
R L
R H  (see part (3) of proposition 1). Hence, again 
Delaware’s price does not reflect the benefits it provides to companies. This result is 
consistent with the observations of (Kahan and Kamar (2001) that Delaware’s actual 
prices seems to fall below a reasonable estimate of the infrastructure and network 




                              
 
3.7    No Competing Investments in Infrastructure 
 
As stated in part (4) of proposition 1, and as explained above, Delaware will set 
a price that would preempt any other state from establishing a competing 
infrastructure. In particular, Delaware’s pricing strategy ensures that if a rival state 
establishes a legal infrastructure, that state will not be able to cover the costs of 
establishing the infrastructure. 
This result is consistent with the empirical observation that no state other than 
Delaware offers a legal infrastructure such as a specialized court (Kahan and Kamar 
(2001)). 
 
3.8   Prices Charged by States other than Delaware 
 
States other than Delaware do not offer a legal infrastructure or network 
externalities (see parts (7) and (11) of proposition 1). These states do not offer 
anything unique. There are at least two revenue-maximizing states (or states that 
maximize the number of incorporations) that offer the exact same “product”. 
Similarly, there are at least two deviating states (with 
R H ) that offer the exact same 
“product”. Competition within each of these two groups of states forces the price to 
the competitive level of zero. In particular, these states can only hope to retain their 
local companies that do not benefit from a legal infrastructure or from network 
externalities (companies with δ ).12 If a non-dominant state sets a price of zero, it 
will be able to retain its local δ  companies, due to our tie-breaking assumption 
that captures a limited “home”-bias. However, if a non-dominant state sets a 
positive price, it will lose even its δ  companies to another non-dominant state 
that sets a lower price. As a result, at equilibrium all of these states will set a price of 
zero.  
                   
12 Revenue-maximizing states (or states that maximize the number of incorporations) can also regain 
their local  0 = j δ  companies that at T=0 were incorporated in Delaware. 
  18These results are consistent with observed patterns. Delaware seems to be the 
only state to derive meaningful revenues from its incorporation business (see Kahan 
and Kamar (2001)). While Delaware charges a significant, though still relatively low, 
franchise tax, no state other than Delaware charges a meaningful franchise tax. 
As just explained, states other than Delaware would not be able to charge 
companies incorporated in them a positive price. But there is another feature of the 
equilibrium suggesting that these states might not be interested in doing so anyway. 
At equilibrium, the companies incorporated in each such state will be the state’s 
local companies13 (see part (11) of proposition 1 and section 3.11 below). While we 
have assumed that states seek to maximize the revenues from incorporated 
companies, an alternative and perhaps more appealing assumption would be that 
each state seeks to maximize revenues from out-of-state incorporations. The reason 
is that the state has many other means of securing revenues from local companies 
(e.g. through standard taxes), and it has no reason to resort to the franchise tax with 
respect to such companies. 
 
3.9  The Delaware Incorporation of all Companies that Benefit from  
Legal Infrastructure and Network Externalities  
 
Delaware will be successful in attracting all of the companies that enjoy the 
benefits of a legal infrastructure and of network externalities (companies with 
1 = j δ ), and will thus become the dominant state. As shown above, no other state 
will establish a competing infrastructure (see parts (4) and (7) of proposition 1). 
Hence, by setting   (see part (2) of proposition 1) and an appropriate price (see part 
(4) of proposition 1), Delaware ensures its ability to lure all 
R L
1 = j δ  companies. 
Delaware clearly lures  1 = j δ  companies from no-infrastructure states that also 
choose  . Delaware also lures 
R L 1 = j δ  companies from the deviating states that set 
R H , since the inefficiency of its   rule is outweighed by Delaware’s infrastructure 
and network externalities advantage (
R L
R Y E > ).14 
                                                 
13 And perhaps some of the  0 = j δ  companies, whose “home” state is one of the deviating states. 
14 That all  1 = j δ  companies incorporate in Delaware is a feature of the unique equilibrium due to 
our assumption that the companies’ (re)incorporation decisions are made sequentially. In a model 
with simultaneous (re)incorporation decisions, there may exist additional equilibria where Delaware 
does not enjoy such dominance. In particular, if for some reason all of the  1 = j δ  companies decide 
to (re)incorporate in Ohio, then Ohio will provide network externalities that may outweigh 
Delaware’s infrastructure advantage, thus sustaining the Ohio-dominance equilibrium. (The 
uniqueness of the Delaware-dominance equilibrium is also maintained in a model where 
(re)incorporation decisions are made cooperatively.) 
  193.10  The Equilibrium Benefits of Incorporating in Delaware  
 
As stated in parts (1) and (2) of proposition 1, and as explained above, in 
equilibrium, all of the states, except for the deviating 
R H  states, set the same rules 
with respect to both the insignificantly redistributive and the redistributive issues. 
Thus, all of these states stand on equal ground with respect to the legal rules 
themselves, but Delaware also offers the benefits of a legal infrastructure and of 
network externalities – benefits for which Delaware does not charge a price equal to 
their full value (see part (6) of proposition 1). As shown above, this will lead 
companies that benefit from a legal infrastructure and from network externalities 
(i.e.  1 = j δ  companies) to incorporate in Delaware. These companies will benefit in 
terms of their share value, and the share value of Delaware companies will be higher 
than the share value of non-Delaware companies.15  
This implication of the model is worth highlighting in light of the approach 
taken by much of the empirical work on state competition.  Substantial work has 
focused on the effects of reincorporation to Delaware and has concluded that such 
reincorporation produces increases in stock market prices (see Bhagat and Romano 
(2001), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2002) for a survey). In addition, some 
recent work has focused on differences in Tobin’s Q among states, and has 
concluded that incorporation in Delaware increases Tobin’s Q compared with 
incorporation in other states (see Daines (2001)). The analysis here indeed predicts 
that Delaware incorporation will have a positive effect on shareholder value.  
The analysis also implies, however, that a positive effect of Delaware 
incorporation on shareholder value would not imply in any way that state 
competition works well, as past empirical work has assumed. As demonstrated, 
evidence that Delaware incorporation or a move to Delaware raises share value 
would be perfectly consistent with competition providing adverse incentives with 
respect to an important set of issues. This is the case because, in equilibrium, states 
would offer similar rules, but one state would also offer the benefits of legal 
infrastructure and network externalities. Thus, the performance of state competition, 
and the quality of the rules it produces, cannot be assessed by studying – in the 
prevailing market equilibrium – the relative differences between Delaware and non-
Delaware incorporations.16  
   
                                                 
15 If Delaware’s second price constraint is binding (see part (4) of proposition 1), then the share value 
of Delaware companies will not be higher than the share value of companies in deviating states. 
16 Note also that, in our model, the firms going to Delaware are different from those remaining in 
their home state. This suggests that empirical studies comparing Delaware and non-Delaware firms 
should pay close attention to problems of selection. 
  203.11  The Relative Performance of Deviating States that Choose Efficient Rules  
 
As shown above Delaware will be successful in attracting all of the companies 
that benefit from an infrastructure and from network externalities (i.e. the  1 = j δ  
companies). Hence, non-Delaware states can only hope to attract companies that do 
not enjoy the benefits of a legal infrastructure and of network externalities 
(companies with  0 = j δ ), since these companies will not be willing to pay the 
positive price charged by Delaware.  
Starting with the non-Delaware states that choose their legal rules in order to 
attract incorporations, since all of these states set the same rules (see parts (1) and (3) 
of proposition 1) and a price of zero (see part (8) of proposition 1), each  0 = j δ  
company that is originally incorporated in a non-Delaware state will remain in its 
home state (recall our tie-breaking assumption); and companies of this kind that are 
originally incorporated in Delaware will reincorporate to their home state. The non-
Delaware deviating states that set 
R H  will succeed in retaining their local  0 = j δ  
companies that are originally incorporated in-state, but will not be able to bring 
home the local companies that were originally incorporated in Delaware. Therefore, 
deviating states will be relatively less successful as compared to states that choose 
their legal rules in order to attract incorporations. 
These results are consistent with the observed patterns. More than 90% of the 
firms are incorporated either in Delaware or in their home state (Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2002)). Furthermore, among non-Delaware states, recent evidence in 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2002) and Subramanian (2002) suggests that states offering 
fewer antitakeover statutes are less successful in retaining their local companies. 
This evidence is consistent with the model’s prediction that states offering pro-
shareholder 
R H  rules will end-up with fewer local incorporations, as compared to 
states that offer the pro-manager   rules. 
R L
 
4.    Extensions 
 
4.1   The Emergence of a Dominant State 
 
Thus far we have assumed the existence of a dominant state, Delaware. 
Delaware’s initial advantage has been characterized by the existence of a legal 
infrastructure, a specialized judiciary, and by a greater number of initial 
incorporations compared to the other states. In the present section, we drop these 
assumptions, and demonstrate how a dominant state may emerge endogenously. In 
particular, we take away from Delaware any initial advantage that it previously 
  21had. Now, without an initial legal infrastructure, we allow Delaware, as well as all 
other states, to establish such an infrastructure. Also, we now assume that all states, 
including Delaware, enjoy the same number of initial incorporations,  . The 
outcome in the market for corporate law under these assumptions is derived below. 
) 0 ( = t m
 
Proposition 2: Assuming that the cost of establishing a legal infrastructure is not too high 
compared to the benefits that companies may derive from such an infrastructure, so that the 
emerging dominant state can cover the cost of establishing a legal infrastructure (K)17, then 
the market for corporate law will have the following unique equilibrium:  
 
(1) The first state to move, Delaware, establishes a legal infrastructure; and 
 
(2) The results stated in proposition 1 hold, with the first-mover state taking the place of the 
(pre-determined) dominant state in proposition 1. 
 
Remark: The intuition for this result, whose detailed proof is omitted, is as follows. 
The first state to move, Delaware, will establish a specialized judiciary because, 
given that it can be expected to be the only state to do so, it will be able to attract all 
of the companies that benefit from a legal infrastructure and from network 
externalities, and thus cover the costs of its investment, K. (While only covering its 
investment, it will be willing to do so since states are assumed to prefer having more 
companies, ceteris paribus.) After the first-mover establishes an infrastructure, and 
since all other states are preempted from entering with a competing infrastructure, 
the remainder of the analysis exactly parallels the analysis summarized in 
proposition 1. 
 
4.2   IPOs 
 
Section 4.2 extends the analysis to allow for the possibility of IPO-stage 
incorporations. As was done in Section 3, we continue to assume the initial existence 
of a dominant state with a legal infrastructure.  Suppose that a number   of 
companies go public after the legal strategies are chosen by the states. Specifically, 
assume that at period T = 2, after the m publicly held companies (henceforth 
“existing companies”) make their (re)incorporation decisions, a  number   of 
companies (henceforth “IPO companies”) are taken public by a “founder,” who also 
IPO m
IPO m
                                                 





















  22chooses their initial state of incorporation. After the initial incorporation of the IPO 
companies, and before period T = 3, the IPO companies, which by then are assumed 
to have a manager with a fraction α of the company’s shares, can reincorporate into 
another state. The outcome in the IPO extension can be summarized by the 
following proposition.  
 
Proposition 3: As long as the number of IPO-stage companies,  , is sufficiently small 
compared to the number of existing companies which are not incorporated in Delaware at T 






i t m ) 0 ( 18 then the market for corporate law will have the following unique 
equilibrium: 
  
(1) The results stated in proposition 1 hold, except for the following adjustment in 
Delaware’s pricing strategy:19 
 
(2) Delaware sets the highest possible price that: preempts a potential rival from entering and 
establishing a competing legal infrastructure; secures the reincorporation (into Delaware—
even from states with 
R H  and P = 0) of all the companies that benefit from a legal 
infrastructure and from network externalities (i.e. companies with  1 = j δ ); and does not 
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Remarks: The intuition for this result, which is generalized and proved in appendix 
B, is as follows: 
Under the condition specified in proposition 3, the outcome in the market for 
corporate law is not altered by the inclusion of IPO-stage incorporations, subject to 
the following adjustment in Delaware’s pricing strategy. Delaware will set the 
highest possible price that still satisfies the following three goals/constraints:  
(1) Preempting rivals: Delaware seeks to preempt rival states from establishing 
a competing infrastructure. To prevent a rival state from establishing an 
                                                 
18 The precise condition is derived in appendix B. The outcome, when this condition is not satisfied, 
is also derived in appendix B as part of a more general analysis of the IPO model. 
19 The results stated in proposition 1 should also be supplemented by specifying the equilibrium 
states of incorporation of the IPO companies, which do not enjoy the benefits of a legal 
infrastructure or of network externalities (companies with  0 = j δ ). These companies will initially 
incorporate in any one of the non-dominant states, and will remain there. 
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. (2) Luring reincorporations from other 
states: Delaware will also wish to ensure that shareholders of companies located in 
other states will approve reincorporation in Delaware. Therefore, Delaware cannot 
price above  . 
(3) The political constraint: Delaware cannot exceed the exogenous (political) 
price-cap, P . 
 
Proposition 3 assumes that the number of IPO-stage companies is not too large 
relative to the number of existing firms not initially incorporated in Delaware. If this 
condition was not satisfied, Delaware could prefer to set 
R H  and focus on the IPO-
stage companies and on the existing companies, which are already incorporated in 
Delaware. With such a strategy Delaware lures fewer companies, but can set a 
higher per-company price. In this case, the second-mover state will establish an 
infrastructure, set   and lure the existing companies that are not already 
incorporated in Delaware.
R L
20 The fact that such an outcome—one with two leading 
states, one focusing on attracting IPO incorporations and one focusing on 
reincorporations by existing publicly traded companies—has not been observed 
suggests that the conditions for the emergence of this equilibrium do not prevail. 
For this reason we have chosen to focus on the equilibrium characterized in 
proposition 3.  
 
4.3    Home-State Bias  
 
In our model, the only reason for some companies to incorporate in their home 
state was that they did not derive benefits from legal infrastructure and network 
                                                 
20 If the number of IPO-stage companies is small, but the number of existing companies, which are 
already incorporated in Delaware, is large, Delaware may choose a third strategy. It may set   and 
focus only on the existing companies, which are already incorporated in it. Again, with such a 
strategy Delaware lures fewer companies, but can set a higher per-company price. 
R L
  24externalities. Consequently, they would derive no benefits from incorporating in 
Delaware and would only have to pay the positive incorporations charges levied by 
Delaware. In the equilibrium, companies not going to Delaware were indifferent 
among the other states, and it was the tie-breaking assumption that resulted in their 
incorporation in their home state in the analyzed equilibrium.  
There are reasons why companies might have a preference for incorporating in 
their home state (see Bebchuk and Cohen (2002) and Daines (2002) for an empirical 
investigation of these reasons). For example, handling legal business at a distance 
might be more costly, and incorporating in the home state might signal the 
company’s loyalty to the state and help the company in its dealings with the state.       
In any event, the model can be extended to allow for home preferences of 
different magnitude. Suppose that for each company there is a cost   to 
incorporating outside its state of headquarters, and suppose that C has a positive 
support in 
0 ≥ C
[ ] C , 0 . Then companies that in equilibrium will incorporate in their home 
state will not be only those that derive no benefits from legal infrastructure and 
network externalities but also those companies for which C is sufficiently large. 
Note that, if the state that is home to such companies had an interest in doing so, it 
would be able to charge such companies a positive price for incorporation in them. 
However, as discussed, since states are already taxing in other ways companies 
h e a d q u a r t e r e d  i n  t h e m ,  i t  i s  f a r  f r o m  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  h a v e  a n  i n t e r e s t  i n  
deriving revenues from them via incorporation charges as well.  
 
4.4   Stickiness and the Power of Network Externalities 
 
In our model, we assume that at T=2 all m companies consider reincorporation. 
It is, however, somewhat unrealistic to assume that all companies find it equally 
easy to alter their state of incorporation. Presumably, a certain level of stickiness 
accompanies the T=0 incorporation endowment. To capture this stickiness effect 
assume that at T=2 only a proportion θ  of all companies can seriously consider 
reincorporation, while the complementary proportion  θ − 1  of all companies remain 
in their T=0 state of incorporation. 
The stickiness effect further reinforces Delaware’s dominance by invoking the 
power of its initial network externalities. Recall that in the basic model at T=0 a 
significant percent of all companies were incorporated in Delaware, but nothing 
prevented these companies from leaving Delaware at T=2. Hence, Delaware could 
not exploit the potential network externalities generated by these companies in its 
pricing strategy. However, when stickiness is accounted for, a proportion  θ − 1  of 
Delaware’s T=0 incorporations will necessarily remain in Delaware. Thus, Delaware 
  25can reflect the network effect generated by these companies in its pricing strategy 
(as if it were part of Delaware’s legal infrastructure). 
In particular, in order to preempt other states from establishing a competing 
infrastructure Delaware no longer needs to limit its price to the per-company value 
of the legal infrastructure, 
m
K
⋅ − ) 1 ( δ
. Delaware can raise its price by the value of the 
network externalities generated by companies that due to the stickiness effect are 
known to remain in Delaware.  Moreover, the power of these network externalities 
will help Delaware in any potential competition with a no-infrastructure state that 
wishes to lure incorporations. 
 
4.5   Price Responses by Delaware to Undercutting by a Rival 
 
In our model, Delaware is not allowed to alter its price after observing other 
states’ pricing strategies. Thus, if Delaware sets an excessively high price, another 
state can choose a slightly lower price, lure all companies away from Delaware, and 
emerge as the dominant state. Of course, as shown above, Delaware can still 
discourage such challenges from other states by appropriately choosing its pricing 
strategy. However, clearly Delaware’s inability to undercut a rival’s price limits its 
market power and forces it to lower its initial (and, in the basic model, final) price. 
Since arguably counter-moves by Delaware are often possible, it is interesting to 
examine an alternative assumption that allows for price undercutting. 
Allowing for price undercutting would further strengthen Delaware’s 
dominant position and its ability to discourage challenges. In such a case, an entrant 
might be concerned about how Delaware would respond and, in particular, that a 
matching by Delaware of what it offers would leave it with no profits. In particular, 
if Delaware initially prices above 
m
K
⋅ − ) 1 ( δ
 (contrary to part (4)(i) of proposition 1), 
a rival state will still be discouraged from establishing a competing infrastructure. 
This potential rival would know that if a competing infrastructure is indeed 
established, Delaware would lower its price below 
m
K
⋅ − ) 1 ( δ
 and thus lure all  1 = j δ  
companies, leaving the rival state with a net loss. Consequently, the first constraint 
on Delaware’s pricing strategy (see part (4)(i) of proposition 1) is alleviated by the 
possibility of price undercutting. The other two constraints (see parts (4)(i) and (4(ii) 
of proposition 1), however, remain effective. 21 
                                                 
21 For further discussion on how investments by challengers might be discouraged when counter-
moves by Delaware are allowed - see Bebchuk and Ferrell (2001) and Bebchuk and Hamdani (2001).   
  265.   Concluding Remarks 
 
The market for corporate law is hardly a simple market. On the supply side, the 
value of the product offered by states depends partly on choices that do not involve 
costs (states’ choices among rules), partly on choices that require a fixed investment 
with little or no variable cost (choices to invest in legal infrastructure), and partly on 
network externalities. On the demand side, the market suffers from an agency 
problem due to the private interests of corporate managers, who have a 
considerable influence on incorporation decisions.  
This paper has developed an analytical framework that enables a fuller and 
more rigorous examination of this unique market than has been thus far possible. 
This framework has enabled us to derive a full characterization of the equilibrium in 
this market. In particular, we have identified how the market performs with respect 
to different categories of corporate rules, the factors that might lead to the 
emergence and persistence of a dominant state, the division of the market, the 
strategies and profits of the dominant state, and the effects that incorporation in (or 
reincorporation to) the dominant state have on corporate value.  
Our analysis has highlighted the significance of the agency problem on the 
demand side of the market. Managers’ veto power over reincorporations, and their 
power to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to shareholders with respect to 
reincorporations, substantially affect the equilibrium. The market for corporate law 
can be expected to perform well with respect to rules that do not have a significant 
effect on private benefits, where the interests of shareholders and managers are 
aligned. However, with respect to rules tha t  d o  h a v e  s u c h  a n  e f f e c t  o n  p r i v a t e  
benefits, where the interests of shareholders and managers might conflict, 
competition drives states to offer some rules that managers, but not shareholders, 
favor. Because the prevailing procedures for switching from state to state play a 
critical role in creating this problem, proposals for changing these rules, in a way 
that would eliminate or diminish managers’ power over switching, are worth 
considering. 22 
Our analysis has implications for the empirical assessment of the performance 
of state competition. Competition might drive all states to adopt the same inefficient 
rules with respect to rules that have significant effects on private benefits of control. 
In equilibrium, moving to the dominant state that provides network and legal 
infrastructure advantages will benefit shareholders, even though the competition as 
                                                 
22  See Bebchuk and Ferrell (2001) for an analysis of the possibility of allowing shareholders to switch 
to another jurisdiction, even against the wishes of managers, with respect to some or all of the rules 
governing the company.  
  27a whole is not performing well with respect to rules that significantly affect private 
benefits. Thus, inferences concerning the overall performance of state competition 
cannot be drawn, as past empirical work has done, from studying the effects that 
Delaware incorporation has on stock prices or Tobin’s Q.  
Our analysis has also contributed to understanding the “industrial 
organization” structure of the market.  Our model explains how investments in legal 
infrastructure (even if not large) combined with network externalities can enable a 
state to establish a dominant position in this market. Furthermore, the analysis 
explains how this dominant state can maintain its position over time, and how the 
desire to maintain this dominance will influence the pricing and rule selection 
decisions of this state.  
An overlooked aspect of the corporate law market, which our analysis has 
identified, concerns the interaction between quality-based competition and price-
based competition in the market for corporate law. We have shown how the 
dominant state, using the fact that it offers unique advantages in terms of legal 
infrastructure and network externalities, can price higher than other states. 
Nevertheless, in order to discourage rival states from challenging its dominance, the 
dominant state will not extract the full value to companies of its relative advantages.  
Our conclusions in this regard can explain the observed pricing patterns in the 
market for corporate law. 
  28APPENDIX A 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
(1) Delaware will set 
NR H . Otherwise, a rival state will establish a legal 
infrastructure, set 
NR H  and lure the  1 = j δ  companies, or Delaware will be forced to 
lower its price to preempt such a rival. All other states will set 
NR H  to retain their 
local companies. 
(2) Delaware will set  , otherwise managers will not initiate reincorporation into 
Delaware (recall the assumption that 
R L
α  is sufficiently small so that managers will 
always prefer a state with   over a state with 
R L
R H ).  
(3) States other than Delaware that choose their legal rules to maximize revenues 
and incorporations will set   in order to retain their local 
R L 0 = j δ  companies. By 
setting   (as well as 
R L
NR H  and  0 = P ), a state prevents managers from initiating 
reincorporation. This strategy further allows states to regain  0 = j δ  local companies 
that were originally incorporated in Delaware. Note that a state can retain its  0 = j δ  
local companies by setting 
R H  (as well as 
NR H  and  0 = P ), which would prevent 
shareholders from approving reincorporation.  But, since the state also wants to 
regain its  0 = j δ  local companies that were originally incorporated in Delaware, it 
will choose  . (Otherwise, these companies will reincorporate in another non-
Delaware state.) 
R L






















Delaware chooses its pricing strategy to ensure that all the  1 = j δ  companies 




⋅ − ) 1 ( δ
 in order 
to preempt other states from establishing a competing infrastructure and 
luring the  1 = j δ  companies.23 Note that a state that decides to establish a legal 
                                                 
23 If no other state could establish a competing infrastructure, Delaware would be able to secure a 
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  A -1infrastructure will not price below 
m
K
⋅ − ) 1 ( δ
; otherwise it will surely lose 
money.24  
(ii) 













) 1 ( δ
min  
To ensure that shareholders of  1 = j δ  companies located in other states will 
approve reincorporation in Delaware, Delaware must make sure that the 
overall package that it offers is more beneficial to shareholders than the 
package offered by the other states (see parts (1), (7) and (8) of the 
proposition), even if these states offer 
R H : 
0 ≥ − − D
R P Y E  
or  
R
D Y E P − ≤ . 
Note that the constraint presumes that Delaware is successful in luring all the 
1 = j δ  companies, and therefore provides substantial network externalities. 
Delaware’s success derives from the preemption of any potential rival, as 
guaranteed by the previous constraint. In the absence of a contender, each one 
of the  1 = j δ  companies anticipates Delaware’s dominance and the resulting 
network effect (see also proof of part (9) below). 
















An exogenously imposed constraint prevents Delaware from pricing above 
P . Thus, to maximize its profits, Delaware will price at P . (Recall that, by 
assumption, in this scenario a price of P  satisfies the constraints imposed by 
the two previous considerations). 
(5) Immediate from the proof of part (4), given that Delaware succeeds in luring 
incorporations (see the proof of part (9) below). 
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. To see this, consider the case 
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⋅ − ) 1 ( δ
. The two states are equally appealing to companies, and therefore according to 
our tie-breaking assumption each state will enjoy all incorporations with a probability of fifty 
percent. However, this means that the second state will lose money on average, and therefore will 
not establish an infrastructure.  
 A  -  2(6) Delaware’s ability to extract value is limited by the constraints on its pricing 
strategy (see part (4) of proposition 1). Consider first the case where the second 
constraint on Delaware’s pricing strategy (see part (4)(ii) of proposition 1) is 
binding, i.e. 
R
D Y E P − = . This price takes into account the fact that states may 
attempt to prevent shareholders of local companies from approving reincorporation 
in Delaware by offering the redistributive rule 
R H . However, at equilibrium these 
other states will offer  , just like Delaware, and not 
R L
R H  (see part (3) of proposition 
1). Hence, again Delaware’s price does not reflect the benefits it provides to 
companies. (This price will reflect the benefits provided by Delaware, as compared 
to the deviating states that set 
R H .) If Delaware does not capture the full value of 
the benefits it confers when the second constraint is binding, as explained above, 
then clearly it will not capture the full value of these benefits if either the first or 
third constraints (see parts (4)(i) and (4)(iii), respectively) are binding. 
(7) Immediate from the proof of part (4). 
(8) As explained above, all states that choose their legal rules to maximize revenues 
and incorporations will set identical legal rules. Therefore, if a non-dominant state 
sets a positive price, it will lose even its  0 = j δ  companies to another non-dominant 
state that sets a lower price. Moving on to the deviating 
R H  states, again since there 
are at least two such states that offer an identical “product”, competition will drive 
the price to zero. 
(9) Since all of the states (except for the deviating 
R H  states that cannot lure 
companies anyway) set identical rules, and in particular  , all of the 
R L 1 = j δ  
companies will reincorporate (or remain) in the state with the most attractive overall 
package, including the full network advantage (created when all  1 = j δ  companies 
incorporate in that state).  
Consider competition between two states with 
NR H  and  , Delaware and 
another state, say Ohio. It will be clear that the proof can be readily extended to 
multi-state competition. Let   and   denote the number of companies that 
have made a decision to incorporate in Delaware and in Ohio, respectively, after 





D P () D D D t m t m − = ( ) ( )) , (  and  ( ) O t O O O P t k E m − O m V = )) ( ( , ) (  denote 
the value provided for  1 = j δ  companies by Delaware and Ohio, respectively 
(excluding the effects of the legal rules which are identical in both states). We now 
show that all the  1 = j δ  companies will reincorporate in Delaware if and only if 
. () () m V m V O D > 25 As shown above (see part (4) of proposition 1), at equilibrium this 
                                                 
25 Recall the tie-breaking assumption that if both Delaware and Ohio are equally appealing, 
companies will reincorporate in each of the two states with a probability of fifty percent. In the 
 A  -  3condition is satisfied. The proof is by backward induction. For simplicity of 
exposition, the proof assumes that all companies are  1 = j δ  companies. 
) 2 >VO
( − t mD




( > m VO
)
)
In the final round, t = m, a company will choose to reincorporate in Delaware if and 
only if  () ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) + − > + − t m V t m O O D D V . In round t = m - 1, a company will choose to 
reincorporate in Delaware if and only if  ( ( ) 2 ) 2 ( ) 2 ( + − + − t m t m O D D V . To see this, 
two cases should be distinguished. First, consider the case in which the company 
has no effect on the t = m reincorporation decision. If 
, the t = m company will reincorporate (or remain) 
in Delaware, regardless of the choice made by the t = m – 1 company. In this 
scenario, the t = m - 1 company will clearly choose Delaware as well. ( 
 implies that 
() () 2 ) 2 ( 1 ) 2 ( + − > + − t m V t O O
() () 2 ) 2 ( 1 ) 2 ( + − > + − t m V t O O
m V D D
m V D D ( )( ( 2 ) 2 ) 1 ) 2 + − > + t m V O O D V . ). 
Similarly, if  () ( ) 2 ) 2 ( 1 ) 2 ( + − > + − t m V t m D D O O
()
V , both the t = m company and the t = m 
- 1 will reincorporate (or remain) in Ohio. Now consider the case, where the t = m - 1 
company determines the t = m reincorporation decision, namely 
( ) 1 ) 2 ( 2 ) 2 ( + − > + − t m V t O O m V D D  but  ( ) ( ) 2 )+ 2 ( 1 ( − < t m V t m O O D D V , or 
 but  () () 1 ) 2 ( 2 ) 2 ( + − > + − t m V t D D m V O O ( ) 2 ) 2 ( 1 ) 2 ( + − + − t m t m O D D
) 2
V . In this case, 
the t = m - 1 company will choose to reincorporate (or remain) in Delaware if and 
only if  () ( ) 2 ( 2 ) 2 ( + − > + − t m V t m V O O D D
()
. Combining the two cases, the t = m - 1 
company will choose to reincorporate (or remain) in Delaware if and only if 
( ) 2 ) 2 ( 2 ) 2 ( + − > + − t m V t O O m V D D . We have also established that if the t = m - 1 
company will choose to reincorporate (or remain) in Delaware, then also the t = m 
company will reincorporate (or remain) in Delaware. 
To complete the backward induction argument, we now show that if 
() ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − + − > − − + − i m i m V i m i m V O O D D
() ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 (
 induces all t  companies to 
reincorporate (or remain) in Delaware, then 
i ≥
− − + − > − − + − i m i m V i m i m V O O D D  induces all   companies to 
reincorporate (or remain) in Delaware (a parallel argument can be made for Ohio). 
1 − ≥ i t
First consider the case where  ( ) ) 2 ) 2 ( 1 ) 2 ( + − + − + − + − i m i i m i m O D D
( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
V . In this 
case, even if the i – 1 company chooses Ohio, in the next round we will still have 
() ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − + − > − − + − m V i m i m V O O D D
() ( 2 ) 2 (
i m i i t ≥
( 2 ) 2
. Namely, all   companies will 
reincorporate (or remain) in Delaware. And, consequently, the i – 1 company will 
also choose Delaware. Next, consider the case where 
+ − + − > + − + − m V i m i m V O O D D i m i  (but 
                                                                                                                                                             
remainder of the proof we abstract from cases in which two states are equally appealing and thus 
use strict inequalities. The analysis can be readily extended to allow for cases in which two states are 
equally appealing using the tie-breaking assumption. 
 A  -  4() ( 2 ) 2 ( 1 ) 2 ( ) + − + − < + − + − i m i m V i m i m V O O D D
() ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
). If the i – 1 company chooses 
Delaware, then in the next round we will have 
) − − + − > − − + − i m i m V i m i m V O O D D
() ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
 and all t  companies will 
reincorporate (or remain) in Delaware. On the other hand, if the i – 1 company 
chooses Ohio, then in the next round we will have 
i ≥
) − − + − < − − + − i m i m V i m i m V O O D D
() 2 ) 2 ( + − + − i m i m V D D
 and all t  companies will 
reincorporate (or remain) in Ohio. The i – 1 company thus compares 
 and 
i ≥
( ) 2 ) 2 ( + − + − i m i
)
m O
() ( 2 ) 2 ( 2 ) 2 (
V , and if  O
+ − + − > + − + − i m i m V i m i m V O O D D
() ( 2 ) 2 ( 2 ) 2 (
 it will choose to reincorporate (or 
remain) in Delaware. Combining the two cases, if 
) + − + − > + − + − i m i m V i m i m V O O D D , then all  1 − ≥ i t  companies to 
reincorporate (or remain) in Delaware. 
() ( ) m V m O D >
0 = j δ
= j δ
R H 0 = j δ
                                                 
1 = j δ
Going back to the first round, all of the companies will choose to reincorporate (or 
remain) in Delaware if V .26 
(10) Immediate from the proof of part (6). 
(11) Companies with   will not reincorporate in Delaware, since they do not 
enjoy Delaware’s infrastructure and network advantages, and thus will not be 
willing to pay Delaware’s high price. Since all non-dominant states that choose their 
legal rules to maximize revenues and incorporations adopt the same strategy (see 
parts (1), (3), (7) and (8) above), then due to our tie-breaking assumption each of 
these states will retain its local companies (and regain its local  0 companies that 
were initially incorporated in Delaware).  Non-dominant deviating states that set 
 will retain their existing   companies, but will not regain their local  0 = j δ  
companies that were initially incorporated in Delaware. These latter companies will 
reincorporate into one of the non-dominant states that choose their legal rules to 
maximize revenues and incorporations.27 
26 The same result would be obtained if all the companies made their incorporation decisions 
cooperatively, rather than non-cooperatively and sequentially. 
27 The equilibrium characterized in proposition 1 relies on the assumption that the fraction of 
companies that are initially incorporated outside Delaware is sufficiently large (see note 4, supra).  
Under this assumption, Delaware is interested in luring companies from their “home” states rather 
than pursuing a strategy of focusing solely on companies that are already incorporated in Delaware. 
However, if the fraction of companies that are initially incorporated outside Delaware is small, 
Delaware may choose a different strategy. It may prefer to focus on its existing companies instead of 
luring all of the   companies. Although Delaware ends up with fewer companies, it may be 
able to charge a higher per-company price. A related issue concerns Delaware’s strategic choice to 
preempt other states from establishing a competing infrastructure. Theoretically, Delaware can focus 
on its existing companies (rather than lure companies from other states), with and without a 
preemption strategy. If Delaware chooses to preempt, it will have to limit its price accordingly. If 
 A  -  5A technical refinement is required to support the equilibrium described in 




















 (see part (4) of the proposition), 
at least one state must adopt a strategy by which it will establish an infrastructure 
and set 







) 1 ( δ
 if Delaware deviates from 





− ) 1 δ ⋅ (
. Without this refinement, Delaware would be able to raise its price 
(i.e. the stated price would not be a best response). Of course, such a higher price 
cannot be sustained at equilibrium, since another state would step in and lure all 
incorporations.  
Similarly, if 













) 1 ( δ
min  (see part (4) of the proposition), at 
least one state must adopt a strategy by which it will set 
NR H , 
R H , and  0 = P  if 
Delaware prices above 
R Y E − . Without this refinement, Delaware would be able to 
raise its price (i.e. the stated price would not be a best response). Of course, such a 
higher price cannot be sustained at equilibrium, since the other states will be able to 




Appendix B contains the complete analysis of the IPO extension. The analysis 
assumes  0 → δ  for expositional simplicity. It can be readily extended to 
accommodate larger values of δ . 
 
Lemma B.1: (i) Delaware can employ strategy  ( ) 1 1 , , P L H
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, lure only existing companies, and make a profit of 
 if and only if 
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1 = j
Delaware chooses not to preempt, another state, say Nevada, may establish a legal infrastructure 
and focus on δ  companies outside Delaware. Still, Delaware will have to make sure that 
Nevada will not attempt to attract Delaware’s existing companies. For this purpose, Delaware again 
will have to limit the price it charges. The limited price, coupled with the smaller number of 
incorporations that Delaware enjoys, suggests that under reasonable assumptions Delaware would 
rather preempt the establishment of a competing infrastructure and lure all   companies, 
rather than focus on its existing companies. 
1 = j δ
 A  -  6If condition (1) is not satisfied, strategy   cannot be part of an equilibrium. 
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all of the companies, and make a profit of Π  if and only if 
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If condition (2) is not satisfied, strategy   cannot be part of an equilibrium. 
D
2 σ
(iii) Delaware can employ strategy  ( ) 3 3 , , P H H








+ = − + = − − +
= −





P IPO D IPO D
R
D IPO
, ) ) 0 ( , ( ) 0 ( ,
) 0 (
, min 3 , 
lure only IPO-stage companies, and make a profit of 
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(i) Strategy  , the equilibrium strategy from the no-IPO model, was shown to 
bring all the existing companies to Delaware in the absence of IPOs. With IPOs, the 
question is whether this strategy will also lure IPO-stage incorporations to 
Delaware. If so, then this strategy can no longer be part of an equilibrium, since a 
rival state would be able to establish a competing infrastructure, set  , and lure all 
the companies—both existing companies and IPO-stage companies—with a lower 
price. This lower price will now cover the costs of the rival state, since there are 
more incorporations. The question is, therefore, whether strategy   lures IPOs. 
Clearly, if no other state establishes an infrastructure, then strategy   will lure 
IPO-stage companies (even if these companies initially incorporate outside 
Delaware). But, with IPOs, strategy   might not lure IPO-stage companies, as a 










R H , and lure the IPO-stage companies 
(the rival will set a price of 
IPO m
K
 in order to cover its costs and preempt other states 
from targeting IPOs in a similar fashion). Such an IPO-targeting rival will be 
successful in drawing the IPO-stage companies away from Delaware if and only if 
 A  -  7IPO
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(ii) Strategy   is aimed at luring all companies. Therefore, Delaware cannot set a 







. Otherwise, a rival state will establish an infrastructure, 
set  , and lure all the companies. Also, since a rival state may establish an 
infrastructure, set 
R L




Delaware will be able to preempt such a rival if and only if 
IPO
R
IPO D IPO m
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(iii) As a third possibility, Delaware can forego existing companies (except for those 
which are initially incorporated in it) and focus on the IPO-stage companies by 






.29 Otherwise, a rival state will establish an infrastructure, set 
R H , and lure 
all the IPO-stage companies. Also, since a rival state may establish an infrastructure, 
set  , and target existing companies (with a price of 
R L
) 0 ( = − t m m
K
D
), Delaware will 
be able to lure the IPO-stage companies if and only if 
                                                 
28 Theoretically, a third state might try to establish an infrastructure and lure companies from both 
Delaware and its IPO-targeting rival.  However, in order to offer companies a package that is better 
than the ones offered by the two other infrastructure states (Delaware with   and the IPO-
targeting state with 
R L
R H ) this third state would have to offer an extremely low price – a price that 
would likely be too low to cover the costs of establishing an infrastructure. 









P < , ( D m K E P  implies  ) , 0 ( ) IPO IPO m E − < , which means that IPO-stage 
companies will prefer Delaware over states without an infrastructure (and with 
R H ). 
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Hence, strategy   is feasible if and only if  
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Lemma B.2: If condition (1) is not satisfied, then condition (2) is necessarily satisfied, 
i.e.  . Therefore, at least one of the two strategies,   and  , is always 
feasible. 
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which, given  , implies condition (2).  QED  0 1 ≥ P
 
Proposition B.1: If a number   of IPO-stage companies choose their states of 
incorporation at the end of period T = 2, then: 
IPO m
(i) If condition (1) is satisfied but conditions (2) and (3) are not satisfied, then 




1 ) 3 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( σ σ = ⇒ ¬ ∩ ¬ ∩ . 
(ii) If condition (1) is not satisfied—which implies that condition (2) is satisfied—and 




2 ) 3 ( ) 1 ( σ σ = ⇒ ¬ ∩ ¬ . 
(iii) If conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied but condition (3) is not satisfied, then 
Delaware will choose strategy  { } ) ( ), ( max arg 2 2 1 1
D D D D D
D
i σ σ σ
σ Π Π = , i.e. 
{ } ) ( ), ( max arg ) 2 ( ) 1 ( 2 2 1 1
D D D D D
D
i σ σ σ
σ Π Π = ⇒ ∩ . 
(iv) If conditions (1) and (3) are satisfied but condition (2) is not satisfied, then 
Delaware will choose strategy  { } ) ( ), ( max arg 3 3 1 1
D D D D D
D
i σ σ σ
σ Π Π = , i.e.  
{ } ) ( ), ( max arg ) 3 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( 3 3 1 1
D D D D D
D
i σ σ σ
σ Π Π = ⇒ ∩ ¬ ∩ . 
(v) If condition (1) is not satisfied—which implies that condition (2) is satisfied—and 
condition (3) is satisfied, then Delaware will choose strategy 
{ } ) ( ), ( max arg 3 3 2 2
D D D D D
D
i σ σ σ
σ Π Π = , i.e. 
 A  -  9{ } ) ( ), ( max arg ) 3 ( ) 1 ( 3 3 2 2
D D D D D
D
i σ σ σ
σ Π Π = ⇒ ∩ ¬ . 
(vi) If all three conditions, (1), (2) and (3), are satisfied, then Delaware will choose 
strategy  { } ) ( ), ( ), ( max arg 3 3 2 2 1 1
D D D D D D D
D
i σ σ σ σ
σ Π Π Π = , i.e.  
{ } ) ( ), ( ), ( max arg ) 3 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( 3 3 2 2 1 1
D D D D D D D
D
i σ σ σ σ
σ Π Π Π = ⇒ ∩ ∩ . 
 
Proof: Immediate from the previous two lemmas. 
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